Active shooter events are among the most disorienting experiences any institution can face. They are sudden, public, fast-moving, and almost always over before the full weight of an emergency response cycle unfolds.

This is not an abstract observation. It is a structural reality that every school administrator, HR director, building security officer, and organizational leader in New York must internalize — and build their safety planning around.

This guide draws on FBI data, the USCCA Countering the Mass Shooter Threat (CMST) curriculum, research from Dr. John Lott Jr. and the Crime Prevention Research Center, the documented teachings of use-of-force authority Massad Ayoob, and behavioral science on mass shooter psychology — to give New York institutions the most complete preparedness picture available.

The Timeline Problem: Why the First Minutes Belong to Civilians

Average police response times for priority emergency calls in the United States vary significantly by jurisdiction:

• Dense urban environments: 5–7 minutes (dispatch-to-arrival)
• Suburban areas like Long Island: 8–12 minutes
• Rural jurisdictions: Often considerably longer

This is not a criticism of law enforcement. It is a function of physics, geography, and dispatch. The point is to acknowledge a biological and operational window that preparedness planning must reflect. According to research from Guard911 citing FBI data, two-thirds of active shooter incidents are over by the time law enforcement arrives. The people already inside the building when an attack begins are the first line of response — whether they prepared for that role or not.

“Two-thirds of active shooter incidents are over by the time law enforcement arrives.”
— Guard911, citing FBI active shooter response data

What the FBI 2024 Data Actually Tells Us

The FBI releases an annual Active Shooter Incidents in the United States report — one of the most rigorously tracked public safety datasets available. For 2026 planning, the 2024 data is the most current available. All active shooter preparedness resources, including the FBI’s civilian safety portal at fbi.gov/survive, are built on this data foundation.

Source: FBI 2024 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Report (June 2025)

The 2024 drop in incidents is encouraging — but the five-year trend matters more than any single year. From 2020 to 2024, there were 223 active shooter incidents across 43 states — a 70% increase over the prior five-year period. One positive year does not change the preparedness calculus. Key 2024 data points for institutional planning:

• Education incidents in 2024: Average police response time was 1 minute 48 seconds — with an average incident duration of 3 minutes 18 seconds. The damage was done before full law enforcement deployment.
• Behavioral indicators: 58% of 2024 shooters exhibited predatory behaviors — observable warning signs that, if recognized and reported, could have created intervention opportunities.
• Location distribution: 50% occurred in open space; 4 in commercial settings; 4 in educational settings; 3 in government facilities; 1 in a house of worship.

The Data They Don’t Report: Armed Citizens Stop More Attacks Than You’ve Been Told

Here is a fact that does not make national headlines: in jurisdictions where law-abiding citizens are legally permitted to carry firearms, armed civilians stop active shooter attacks with remarkable frequency — and the official data dramatically undercounts it.

Dr. John Lott, president of the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPRC) and former senior advisor at the Department of Justice, has spent years documenting the systematic gap between FBI reporting and the actual record of defensive gun use. His October 2025 analysis, published via RealClearInvestigations and the Washington Times, documents the case record using the FBI’s own definitions.

What the FBI Reports vs. What the Data Shows

Between 2014 and 2024, the FBI reported that armed citizens stopped 14 of the 374 active shooter incidents it identified — approximately 3.7%. The CPRC, applying the same FBI definition but using more complete case documentation, identified 561 active shooter incidents in that same period. Of those, armed citizens stopped 202 — or 36% of all incidents.

The most operationally significant finding: when looking only at incidents that occurred in locations where civilians could legally carry firearms, the CPRC found that 52.5% of attacks were stopped by people legally carrying concealed handguns. In 2024 alone, that rate rose to 62.5%.

Source: Dr. John R. Lott Jr., Crime Prevention Research Center, October 2025 | RealClearInvestigations

“What is rare is not armed citizens stopping attacks. What is rare is national news coverage of those incidents.”
— Dr. John R. Lott Jr., Crime Prevention Research Center, October 2025

The Gun-Free Zone Problem

The CPRC data has a second major finding: 92% of mass public shootings occur in gun-free zones. This is not a coincidence. Lott’s research documents multiple attackers who explicitly stated in planning materials that they selected locations based on the absence of likely armed resistance. One attacker in a 2025 mass shooting wrote in his manifesto that he was aware prior shooters may have chosen gun-free venues — and that he planned accordingly. That is not theory. That is documented target selection based on victim disarmament.

For New York institutions, this is not a comfortable fact. But it is a real one — and safety planning that ignores it is not complete safety planning.

Ayoob’s Data Analysis Confirms It

Massad Ayoob — use-of-force authority, police officer, and expert witness — arrived at a parallel conclusion through his own study of rapid mass murder cases:

“Only about half of rapid mass murders were ever stopped by anyone. This meant that half of the mass murdering was only stopped when the murderers said it stopped. Then, in the other half when rapid mass murder was stopped by someone, there was my astonishment that about two thirds of that half were stopped by on-site citizens — mostly unarmed — or on-site security, not off-site police officers.”
— Massad Ayoob, Straight Talk on Armed Defense: What the Experts Want You to Know

In attacks that were stopped at all, roughly two-thirds were stopped not by responding police, but by people already in the building — civilians and on-site security, often unarmed. The people already present are the real first responders. That is both a sobering fact and a call to train, prepare, and equip the people inside your walls.

The Modern Threat Landscape: Soft Targets and Behavioral Patterns

Security professionals use the term soft target not as a moral judgment, but as a structural description. A soft target is any environment characterized by open access, high occupant density, predictable routines, limited physical screening, and low visible deterrence. In practical terms, that describes most of the places New Yorkers work, learn, and gather:

• K–12 schools and universities
• Corporate offices and business parks
• Retail centers and commercial buildings
• Houses of worship
• Healthcare facilities and clinics
• Entertainment venues and public gathering spaces

Attackers seek structural advantage. Soft targets offer predictability, density, and low initial resistance. Understanding this is not about living in fear — it is about designing environments and systems that reduce that advantage wherever possible.

Attacker Behavioral Patterns

The 2024 FBI report confirmed that 58% of active shooters exhibited predatory behaviors before their attacks — meaning they considered, planned, and prepared for violence. Commonly documented pre-incident patterns include grievance fixation that becomes all-consuming; social isolation combined with increased agitation; “leakage” of intent through online posts or verbal statements; obsession with prior attackers; and rapid life destabilization in the weeks before an incident (job loss, relationship failure, legal trouble).

Many tragedies reveal missed signals — not absent ones. The difference between a near-miss and a mass casualty event is often a reporting culture, not a reporting system.
— NY Safe Inc. Operational Analysis

The Psychology of the First Gunshot — Normalcy Bias

Survivor testimony from active shooter events follows a remarkably consistent pattern. People report saying — or thinking — things like “I thought it was a car backfiring” or “I froze — I just stood there” or “I didn’t believe it was real.” This is normalcy bias: the cognitive tendency to interpret unexpected events through familiar, non-threatening explanations. It is not weakness. It is biology. The brain defaults to familiar patterns under stress.

Under acute stress, the body also experiences auditory exclusion (shots may not register as shots), time distortion, tunnel vision, fine motor degradation, and decision paralysis. Training is the countermeasure — not because it makes people fearless, but because rehearsal creates a pre-loaded decision path. When the brain already knows what to do, it does not need to build the response from scratch under pressure.

FBI’s Run. Hide. Fight. — The Civilian Survival Framework

The FBI’s civilian survival model — available at fbi.gov/survive — remains the most widely adopted and practically sound framework for institutional use. Its power is in its simplicity. Complex decision trees fail under stress. Three words do not.

What Drives Them: Fame, Suicide, and the Media’s Role in the Next Attack

Understanding why mass shooters attack is not an academic exercise. It is prevention intelligence. One of the most consistent, well-documented patterns in the research — one that almost never dominates the mainstream post-incident coverage — is this: a substantial portion of mass shooters are not trying to escape. They are trying to die famous.

The Suicide-Infamy Nexus

Research published across multiple peer-reviewed journals, and cited by the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit, documents that mass shooters targeting schools and public spaces for maximum visibility exhibit a specific psychological profile:

• Nearly half of all mass shooters are suicidal before they act. An estimated 30% kill themselves at the scene; another 10% engage in “suicide by cop.” (Columbia University Department of Psychiatry, 2022)
• Fame-seeking shooters exhibit grandiose behaviors in 86.7% of cases, combined with narcissistic traits and a profound sense of personal grievance (ScienceDirect, 2019)
• A 2020 review found that 78% of mass shooters from 2010–2019 were motivated by fame-seeking or attention-seeking
• Among school shooters specifically: 72% felt suicidal and 87% planned their attack in advance (Hobbs, 2019)
• Researchers have found a direct statistical relationship between fame-seeking motivation and higher victim counts — killers who wanted more coverage killed more people to get it

Research from Adam Lankford (University of Alabama) and Eric Madfis, published in the American Behavioral Scientist and cited by RAND, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit, and Texas State University’s ALERRT Center, found that mass shooters received more media coverage in the month after their attack than famous American celebrities, Super Bowl champions, and Academy Award winners. They killed to be known. The media made them known. And the next attacker was watching.

The Contagion Effect Is Documented

• A 2015 study found that after a major mass shooting, the probability of another attack increased for the next 13 days, with each incident inciting at least 0.3 new events
• A third of white supremacist attacks between 2011 and 2020 were copycat attacks in which perpetrators explicitly cited admiration for prior attackers (RAND, 2023)
• Researchers at Arizona State University estimated that eliminating national media sensationalism of mass shooters could result in a one-third reduction in shootings

Don’t Name Them — NY Safe Endorses This Movement

Take a moment and ask yourself honestly: Can you name a victim from Columbine? From Virginia Tech? From Sandy Hook? For most people, the answer is no — or they can name one or two. Now ask: can you name the attackers? In virtually any room, someone can. That is the problem.

The Don’t Name Them campaign asks media, law enforcement, public information officers, and citizens to:

• Refuse to amplify the attacker’s name, image, or manifesto beyond what is strictly necessary for law enforcement or public safety
• Redirect attention to victims, heroes, first responders, and survivors — the people whose names deserve to be remembered
• Understand that every time we share a shooter’s name or photo on social media, we are completing a part of their plan
• Recognize that mass shootings are, for a substantial subset of attackers, an attempt to achieve in death what they could not achieve in life: significance and permanence

“The suspects should be as unrecognized in their deaths as they were in their lives.”
— DontNameThem.org Mission Statement, ALERRT / FBI

The FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit has stated directly that media coverage of mass shooters “cements the legacies they seek to achieve.” Denying them that legacy is not censorship. It is prevention. It honors the people who deserved the attention we have been giving to the people who did not.

The USCCA CMST Curriculum: What Goes Beyond the Basics

NY Safe Inc. holds instructor certification in the United States Concealed Carry Association (USCCA) Countering the Mass Shooter Threat (CMST) curriculum — one of the most rigorous, data-driven civilian active threat education programs in the country. The CMST framework goes significantly beyond Run/Hide/Fight. It was developed through systematic analysis of mass shooting data since Columbine and is structured specifically for schools, businesses, and houses of worship.

What the USCCA CMST Curriculum Covers

• Historical data analysis: A structured review of documented mass shootings — what happened, what decisions were made, and what outcomes resulted
• Attacker psychology and target selection: Understanding why specific environments are chosen and how that shapes defensive design
• Pre-incident behavioral indicators: Practical pattern recognition for staff and administrators
• Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) development: A structured, organization-specific planning process — not a generic template
• Communication protocols under duress: Who calls what, when, and how to avoid catastrophic communication failures
• Reunification planning: A frequently overlooked and critically important component, especially for schools
• Triage and trauma response: Basic hemorrhage control in the gap before EMS arrival
• Legal and liability considerations: What documentation of training means for institutions in a litigation context

For organizations seeking to go beyond basic compliance and build genuinely defensible preparedness programs, CMST-informed training is a meaningful differentiator. Contact NY Safe Inc. to discuss a consultation for your school, business, or institution.

New York-Specific Preparedness Considerations

Preparedness is not a generic national exercise. For New York institutions, specific legal, regulatory, and operational contexts shape both requirements and exposure.

Workplace Violence Prevention: New York State’s Workplace Violence Prevention Law requires employers to assess workplace violence risk and implement programs to address identified hazards. The active threat environment is increasingly part of that assessment landscape.

School Safety Planning Mandates: New York’s Education Law requires districts to maintain comprehensive school safety plans and building-level emergency response plans subject to review by law enforcement including county sheriff’s offices and state police. Legal framework exists — but many institutions treat compliance as a documentation exercise rather than an operational readiness investment.

Liability and Documentation: In New York’s litigation environment, documentation of preparedness efforts is a defense. An institution that can demonstrate annual active threat training with attendance logs, written EOPs with dated revisions, tabletop exercise records, facility vulnerability assessments with remediation notes, and staff training certifications from credentialed providers — is in a materially different legal position than one that cannot.

Building a Structured Institutional Preparedness Framework

Active shooter preparedness is not an event. It is a system. It requires intentional design, maintained documentation, periodic rehearsal, and genuine leadership commitment.

1. Executive Awareness and Leadership Buy-In

Preparedness programs that live in the HR manual and nowhere else are not preparedness programs. They are liability documentation. Real preparedness begins when leadership understands the actual timeline of an active shooter event, their communication responsibilities during and after an incident, media dynamics in the aftermath, and the legal review process. Executives who have never sat through a serious tabletop exercise cannot lead an effective institutional response.

2. Facility Vulnerability Assessment

A structured walk-through evaluated through a threat lens — not a routine safety lens — often reveals significant, low-cost improvements. A credible assessment evaluates entry control points, locking hardware (can doors be quickly locked from the inside?), visitor management protocols, camera coverage and monitoring, sight lines, evacuation routes, safe room options, and placement of trauma/bleed control kits. Minor environmental changes — door hardware, camera angles, entry redesign — can substantially improve outcomes without large capital investment.

3. Behavioral Threat Assessment Team

Most mass violence events are preceded by observable warning behaviors that, if recognized and reported, created opportunities for intervention. An effective behavioral threat assessment team (BTAT) is multidisciplinary — including administration or HR, legal counsel, mental health resources, and law enforcement liaison. The key infrastructure: anonymous reporting mechanisms that people actually trust and use; clear evaluation thresholds; documented follow-up for every report; and defined escalation pathways including law enforcement notification when warranted.

4. Staff Education: Beyond the Compliance Checkbox

Effective staff education addresses: recognizing ambiguous sounds quickly to break the normalcy bias cycle; decision trees for Run/Hide/Fight in their specific environment; barricading techniques specific to the actual doors and furniture in their space; communication clarity — who calls 911, what information to give; and law enforcement arrival protocols.

5. Scenario-Based Tabletop Exercises

A written plan that has never been tested is a planning document. A tested plan is a preparedness asset. Tabletop exercises — structured, facilitated discussions of hypothetical scenarios — surface communication breakdowns between departments, accountability gaps, reunification plan weaknesses, media response gaps, and plan activation ambiguity. Leaders who have rehearsed difficult decisions in low-stakes environments make better decisions in high-stakes ones.

Bleed Control: The Survivability Bridge

Severe hemorrhage is the leading preventable cause of death in penetrating trauma. In active shooter events, the gap between the incident and EMS arrival is often 10 minutes or more. The ability to control bleeding in that window is the difference between a life lost and a life saved.

Organizations that integrate the following save lives that a response-only approach would lose:

• Bleed control kits in accessible, known locations throughout the facility — not locked, not in a back room
• Tourniquet familiarity — staff who have applied a tourniquet on a training limb are meaningfully more effective than those who have only seen one
• Basic hemorrhage control knowledge — wound packing, direct pressure, recognizing life-threatening versus superficial injuries

Massad Ayoob: What America’s Foremost Use-of-Force Authority Teaches

Massad Ayoob is a police officer, courtroom expert witness, founder of the Lethal Force Institute in 1981, and arguably the most widely cited use-of-force authority in American legal and law enforcement circles. His book Deadly Force: Understanding Your Right to Self Defense is required reading in law enforcement academies and civilian programs alike. Straight Talk on Armed Defense assembled the most credentialed voices in the field under one roof.

On Deterrence and Responsible Carry

One of Ayoob’s most important observations is that the person who is fully prepared to use force is, in practice, less likely to need to. He has taught extensively that predators are skilled at reading body language and selecting targets who project compliance and inattention. An aware, confident, postured individual — one who is scanning, present, and grounded — is not an attractive target. The lawfully armed person who has internalized their responsibility tends to project a quality that criminal actors recognize and avoid. And the deterrent factor of an unknown — the inability of an attacker to know who might resist — is itself a structural disincentive that gun-free zones eliminate entirely.

“Those of us who have seen violent death up close, who have seen what high-powered bullets can do to living human tissue, have a horror of inflicting that nightmarish, never forgotten damage on a fellow human being. Perhaps the only more terrifying prospect is that such a fate should befall us or our loved ones. This is why we keep deadly weapons for personal defense.”
— Massad F. Ayoob, In the Gravest Extreme: The Role of the Firearm in Personal Protection

This is the posture NY Safe teaches. The firearm is a last resort, carried by a person who has spent more time learning to avoid using it than anything else. The decision to carry legally is a decision to accept a profound responsibility — for one’s own life, for the safety of others, and for the integrity of the legal system. It is not bravado. It is citizenship at its most serious.

The Ayoob Five-Point Post-Incident Checklist

Surviving a defensive encounter physically is only half the equation. Surviving it legally is the other half. Ayoob developed the Five-Point Checklist — now recommended by the USCCA, the Armed Citizens Legal Defense Network, and adopted by law enforcement agencies nationwide:

1. Establish the active dynamic. Not “I shot him” — but “This man attacked me / was trying to kill me.” The active dynamic is his action that forced your lawful response.
2. Indicate you will sign a complaint. This immediately establishes you as the victim, not the perpetrator.
3. Point out any evidence. Shell casings, a dropped weapon, injuries — anything that may disappear in the chaos of the scene.
4. Point out any witnesses. Identify anyone who saw what happened before they leave.
5. Invoke counsel. After those four steps, stop: “Officer, you’ll have my full cooperation after I’ve spoken with counsel.”

The Second Amendment and the Active Shooter Problem: An Honest Analysis

NY Safe Inc. is not a political organization. We do not endorse candidates or legislation. But we are a safety organization — and responsible safety education requires engaging honestly with data even when it challenges convenient narratives.

The policy response to active shooter events most often proposed in media and legislative chambers is restriction: fewer guns, tighter controls, expanded gun-free zones. The data from Lott, Ayoob, and two decades of FBI incident analysis raises a question that deserves serious engagement: Does restricting lawful carry in public spaces make people safer — or does it make them more vulnerable?

The CPRC data indicates that 92% of mass public shootings occur in gun-free zones. The stop rate in carry-permitted locations is more than 10 times the FBI-reported national average. Attackers have explicitly cited the absence of armed resistance in their target selection. These are not talking points. They are documented findings that belong in any honest safety analysis.

New York has some of the most restrictive carry laws in the country. The CCIA severely limits where permit holders may carry. Those restrictions exist in law, and NY Safe operates fully within them. But our job as safety educators is to be clear about what the evidence shows: disarming law-abiding people in a given location does not make that location safer. It makes it more predictable — for the person planning the attack.

For New York permit holders, this makes training, legal literacy, and responsible carry more important — not less. For New York institutions, the honest question is whether your safety planning reflects the world as it is, or the world as you wish it were. Wishing that an attacker will respect the sign on the door is not a plan. Training, awareness, behavioral monitoring, documentation, bleed control capability, and educated staff — that is a plan.

Executive Preparedness Checklist

Use this checklist to assess where your organization currently stands. Each unchecked item is an identified gap — and an opportunity to close it before it matters.

• ☐ Leadership has received a substantive active shooter threat briefing
• ☐ A written, current Emergency Operations Plan exists and has been reviewed in the last 12 months
• ☐ The EOP has been reviewed by or shared with local law enforcement
• ☐ A facility vulnerability assessment has been conducted by a credentialed professional
• ☐ Entry control procedures are documented and enforced consistently
• ☐ All exterior and interior doors can be quickly locked from the inside
• ☐ A behavioral threat assessment process or team exists
• ☐ An anonymous, accessible reporting mechanism for concerning behaviors is in place
• ☐ All staff have received active shooter training in the last 12 months
• ☐ At least one tabletop exercise has been conducted with leadership in the last 24 months
• ☐ Bleed control kits are installed in multiple accessible locations
• ☐ At least a subset of staff have hands-on hemorrhage control training
• ☐ Reunification protocols are documented and communicated to affected stakeholders
• ☐ A post-incident communication and counseling plan exists
• ☐ Training records and exercise logs are documented and retained

If fewer than 10 of these 15 items are checked, your organization has meaningful preparedness gaps. A free consultation with NY Safe Inc. is a reasonable starting point.

Frequently Asked Questions

How often should active shooter training occur?

At a minimum, annually — with periodic refreshers for new staff. Tabletop exercises for leadership should occur at least every two years. The goal is not compliance; it is retention of decision-making frameworks under stress. Annual repetition matters because people forget and environments change.

Does active shooter training create fear or anxiety in staff?

This is a common and legitimate concern. Research consistently suggests the opposite: structured training reduces anxiety by replacing ambiguity with a plan. The fear is not of the training — it is of uncertainty. Preparedness replaces uncertainty with process. Staff who know what to do feel more capable, not more afraid.

Is this primarily a school issue?

No. The 2024 FBI data shows active shooter incidents distributed across commercial, government, educational, open-space, and religious settings. Businesses, healthcare facilities, houses of worship, and corporate campuses all operate in the same threat environment.

Does documenting and conducting training increase legal liability?

The evidence and legal logic run in the opposite direction. Properly structured training and retained documentation generally demonstrate due diligence — which is a defense, not a vulnerability, in litigation. Courts have repeatedly scrutinized institutions that failed to implement reasonable preparedness measures.

Should our organization have armed staff or security?

That decision belongs to governing boards and their legal counsel, evaluated against applicable New York state and local law. NY Safe does not advocate for a specific position in an institutional context. What we state clearly: armed or unarmed, no organization can substitute armed response for the broader preparedness framework described in this guide. The planning, behavioral assessment, training, and trauma response components are necessary regardless of armed capacity.

What is the difference between the FBI’s Run/Hide/Fight model and USCCA CMST?

Run/Hide/Fight is a civilian survival framework — three words designed to give individuals a pre-loaded decision path in the moment an attack begins. USCCA Countering the Mass Shooter Threat (CMST) is an institutional preparedness framework — a structured program for organizations to analyze threat patterns, build Emergency Operations Plans, train staff, integrate trauma response, and reduce institutional vulnerability before an attack ever begins. They are complementary.

Why does NY Safe endorse the Don’t Name Them campaign?

Because the behavioral science is compelling and the logic is sound. A significant percentage of mass shooters are suicidal individuals seeking fame. Denying them fame is a form of disruption. Research indicates that sensationalized media coverage of shooters’ names, images, and manifestos measurably increases the probability of subsequent attacks. The Don’t Name Them movement — backed by ALERRT and the FBI — is a prevention strategy, not a censorship argument. We choose to focus on the heroes and the victims: the people who deserve to be remembered.

Where can I find free government resources for active shooter preparedness?

The FBI’s active shooter safety portal at fbi.gov/survive includes training videos, the annual incident report, and resources by institution type. FEMA’s ready.gov/active-shooter provides planning guides. The Stop the Bleed program offers free hemorrhage control resources. These are excellent starting points — not substitutes for structured institutional training.

The Central Reality

Active shooter preparedness for schools and businesses is not an emotional response to news cycles. It is operational leadership — the same disciplined, systematic thinking that good organizations apply to financial risk, compliance, and business continuity.

The institutions that navigate active shooter events well are not the ones with the best luck. They are the ones that did the work beforehand. They planned. They trained. They documented. They rehearsed difficult decisions in low-stakes settings so they could execute them in high-stakes ones. And they built cultures where people feel empowered to report concerns before those concerns become tragedies.

Most violence is avoidable. Most attacks are preceded by observable signals. The first minutes of any attack are civilian-dependent. Legal ignorance and organizational unpreparedness cost lives — both physical ones and institutional ones.

Preparedness is not paranoia. It is professional responsibility — and it belongs to the people already in the building.
— NY Safe Inc. Core Belief

Primary Sources & External References

• FBI — 2024 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Report (June 2025)
• FBI Active Shooter Safety Resources — fbi.gov/survive
• Crime Prevention Research Center — Dr. John R. Lott Jr., Armed Citizens and Active Shooter Data (October 2025)
• USCCA — Countering the Mass Shooter Threat (CMST) Curriculum
• DontNameThem.org — ALERRT / FBI Campaign to Deny Infamy to Mass Shooters
• DHS — Active Shooter: How to Respond (Civilian Guide)
• Stop the Bleed — American College of Surgeons Hemorrhage Control Program
• RAND Corporation — When Mass Shooters Are Seeking Fame (2023)
• Columbia University Department of Psychiatry — Mass Shootings and Mental Illness (2022)
• Massad Ayoob, Deadly Force: Understanding Your Right to Self Defense (Gun Digest Books)
• Massad Ayoob, Straight Talk on Armed Defense: What the Experts Want You to Know (Gun Digest Books)
• FEMA Ready.gov — Active Shooter Preparedness Resources

Disclaimer: This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Always consult qualified legal counsel regarding use-of-force law in your jurisdiction. NY Safe Inc. operates in full compliance with all applicable New York State and federal firearms laws.

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